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STATEMENT OF THE :JATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a civil action seeking a resolution between 
conflicting claims of right to possession of certain real ?ro-
perty situate in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The case was heard without a jury by the Honorable 
James S. Sawaya in the Third District Court of Salt Lake County, 
Utah. Pursuant to motions by defendants/respondents, the 
claims of plaintiff/appellant to the real property in question 
were severed so that a speedierresolution of the counterclaimed 
unlawful detainer could be obtained. The lower court deter-
nined that plaintiffskespondents had neither assumed nor negoti-
ated a new valid lease with defendants/respondents and that 
plaintiffs had been served with effective notice under §78-36-3, 
Utah Code Ann., (1953), to terminate their month-to-month ten-
ancy. The Court declared the rights of defendants to possession 
of the premises and to damages for hold-over. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff/appellant seeks a reversal of the holding 
that it did not have the right to peaceful occupation of the 
premises through assumption of ·a lease from predecessor tenant 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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of defendants/respondents. Alternately, it seeks to have this 
Court declar~ the lease negotiated by plaintiff and defendants 
equitably enforceable. 
The existence of a binding lease will mandate that 
purported service of notice to quit be found defective under 
Utah unlawful detainer standards. Thus no detainer action will 
sbund or damages issue. 
Should the Court determine that plaintiff/appellant 
is liable in unlawful detainer, then third party defendant/ 
appellant seeks to be declared not personally responsible for 
damages. (Third party defendant/appellant was not explicitly 
found personally liable and argues that he is not.) 
Finally, should the Court reject the arguments absolv-
ing either appellant, appellants then seek to have the amount 
of damages awarded reduced as improper. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Defendant and third party plaintiff Intermountain 
Stock Exchange (Intermountain') , a Utah corporation, owned certain 
real property known as the Exchange Building, located at 39 Exchan~ 
Place, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
A part of the basement of this property was leased 
by INVESTESTATE, INC. (Investestate), a Utah corporation, for 
the purpose of operating a private club known as the "Exchange 
Club" on August 1, 19 76. Ihvestestate had leased this space from 
- 2 -
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Intermountain and operated a club there from at leas~ as •1rly 
as March 23, 1973, as evidenced by an earlier agreement. To 
operate the Exchange Club, Investestate entered into an equip-
ment lease with Murray First Thrift {MFT), on July 31, 1973. 
As part of the ordinary course of business, MFT obtained a 
consent and waiver from the landlord, Intermountain, to pro-
tect its interests in the equipment. 
The Exchange Club was unable to operate at a profit, 
and Investestate was forced to breach its property and equipment 
leases. Its principal owner, Stan Adams, an attorney, worked 
out various arrangements with Intermountain and MFT and paid 
his obligations as able. Results of the difficulties experi-
enced by Investestate were an alleged termination of the 
August 1, 1976 lease and a later threat of foreclosure on the 
equipment. 
\ 
Pete Buffo, in his capacity as President of Ute-Cal 
Land Development Corporation {Ute-Cal), a Utah corporation, 
became aware in May 1978 that the leased equipment was poten-
tially available. Directed by MFT to Stan Adams at the Exchange 
Club to inspect the equipment, Buffo was asked by Adams to 
consider purchasing the Club intact, rather than merely the 
equipment for salvage. 
The continuation of an ongoing business at the same 
location offered substantial advantages to all the parties. 
- 3 -
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MFT would not have to foreclose the equipment at a loss, but 
was agreeable to having Ute-Cal assUIDe the lease. Interrnountain 
would continue receiving rent on its property and avoid modi-
fication for a different tenant. Investestate and Adams would 
be relieved of their losses and obligations. Thus all parties 
entered into various mutual negotiations, making various repre-
sentations and proposals. As a result, Ute-Cal assumed the 
equipment lease and took possession of the Exchange Club pre-
mises at the beginning of June 1978. Ute-Cal asserted right 
to possession either under a written assignment from Investestate, 
or as an equitable consequence of the dealings with Intermountain 
and its President, Reo Cutler. Specifically, Ute-Cal asserts 
the validity of a negotiated lease sent by its counsel, Loni F. 
DeLand, near August 1, 1978 to Jon Heaton, attorney for Intermount< 
This lease was attached as Exhibit "A" to the plaintiff's Com-
plaint in this action. 
Economic difficulties at the Club again caused diffi-
culties between landlord and tenant. 
In August 1979, disregarding an alleged first right 
of refusal to Ute-Cal, Intermountain sold the Salt Lake Stock 
and Mining Exchange to Exchange Associates (Exchange Associates), 
whose managing partner was Whitney Cluff. 
Exchange Associates and Ute-Cal were unable to reach 
a lease agreement. Consequently, Exchange Associates caused 
- 4 -
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to be served a Notice to Quit the premises on December 12, i11q. 
Based on the totality of the circumstances, Ut•-Cal 
reacted to the Notice by filing suit claiming the existence of 
a lease, that defendants Intermountain and Exchange _;ssociates 
should be estopped from denying the lease, or alternately dam-
ages for loss of use and benefit. Plaintiff also sought a 
declaration of its right of first refusal and conformity with 
same, attorney's fees, court costs and other just relief. Oefen-
dants counterclaimed against Ute-Cal for unlawful detainer, and 
filed a. third party complaint against Buffo for unlawful detainer. 
The unlawful detainer action was subsequently severed from plain-
tiff's action so that a swift determination of the right of 
possession could be reached. It is from the finding of hold-
over and the award of damages that Ute-Cal and Buffo now appeal. 
evidence 
However, 
A R G U M E N T 
POINT I 
NEITHER UTE-CAL NOR PETE BUFFO WERE MONTH-TO-
MONTH TENANTS. 
The standard of appellate review in Utah views the 
in the light most favorable to sustain the lower court. 
the findings will be disturbed if they are clearly 
against the weight of the evidence or if it manifestly appears 
that the Court ~isap~lied the law to the established facts. 
Hardy v. Hendrickson, 495 P.2d 28, 29 (Utah 1972). The present 
- .'.) -
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case provides just such an instance where the findings of the 
lower court are so grossly conflicting with the evidence that 
this Court should be compelled to correct and reverse. 
A. THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SHOW 
A VALID ASSIGNMENT OF INVESTESTATE'S 
LEASE TO UTE-CAL. 
Ute-Cal asserts alternate theories in the present 
action. It claims that its right to possession of the Exchange 
Club is based on assumption of a legitimate lease to the pro-
perty or through negotiations for a new lease that cause a par-
ticular negotiated lease to be equitably enforced. Thus the 
first question considered must be the rights assigned by 
Investestate to Ute-Cal. 
Respondents admit the validity of an August 1, 1976 
lease with Investestate (Exhibit 15), but claim that lease was 
terminated on October 13, 1977 by a notice of termination (Ex-
hibit 2). The August 1 lease did contain, in Article XVI, a 
first right of refusal, and in Article XVII an option to extend 
for two five-year periods. 
The lease was not terminated effectively by Exhibit 2 
because that notice was never delivered to or signed by Stan 
Adams (as admitted by counsel for Intermountain, 
Tr. 63). Rather, that document was delivered to the secretary 
of Stan Adams' brother, with whom Stan has never been associated. 
- 6 -
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Adams further denied ever having seen ~~e ~ermi~ation no~ice 
before the present litigation (Tr. 55). 
The continuation in full force and effect of the lease 
is bolste~ed by the testimony of James Carline and Pete Buff?. 
Carline testifies at Tr. 103 concerning Cutler's represent3tions 
about the existence of the Adams lease "in jeopardy." Buffo's 
testimony meanwhile supports Adams' belief of the validit~r of 
the lease in May or June of 1978 (Tr. 114). See also Buffo's 
deposition (BD) 36. 
Exhibit 31 is an assignment of Investestate's rights 
under the August 1 lease to Ute-Cal. Thus Ute-Cal acquired 
not only the right of first refusal and options to extend, both 
privileges that are repeated frequently throughout the trans-
cript as necessary for making the business feasible and the 
acquisition of the equipment lease possible, but received as 
well the right to estop defendants from denying the effect 
of that lease. And although it is true that Ute-Cal failed 
to exercise its right to extend the original term, it did so 
only because it had received assurances from Intermountain 
that Exhibit 17, Ute-Cal's negotiated lease that contained 
equivalent terms and protections, was acceptable and would 
soon be ratified. (See BD 25, 52.) Respondents should not 
now be heard to assert that the presumed valid lease was not 
extended because it was their actions that prevented the option 
from being exercised. 
- 7 -
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B. THE TRIAL COURT'S DETERMINATION THAT 
NO EXCEPTIONS TO THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS 
APPLY IS CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE. 
Disregarding the rights allegedly conferred through 
the assignment of Investestate's lease, other rights rest with 
Ute-Cal. Respondents have attempted to negate the effect of 
the unsigned agreement between Ute-Cal and Intermountain claim-
ing that Utah's Statute of Frauds, § 25-5-3, Utah Code Ann., 
(1979 Supp.), voids any interest in land unless there is a sub-
scribed writing. However, the actions of .the parties prove not 
only "equitable estoppel" and "part performance" exceptions to 
the Statute, but show a waiver by Intermountain of the execution 
of the lease. This Court should find, therefore, that the Statub 
of Frauds does not bar the present action and that Ute-Cal's 
negotiated lease should be enforced. 
Defendants, in their trial brief, analyze the require-
ments of prior Utah law for a finding of part performance seem-
ingly unaware of the growing trend in favor of part performance 
~ 
or the more recent Utah Supreme Court decision. In Adams v. 
Taylor, 391 P.2d 837 (Utah 1964), the Court was willing to find 
that the acceptance of payments by lessor removed the case from 
the Statute of Frauds because of the inherent unfairness of 
allowing lessor to receive the benefits of an unratified agree-
ment while denying his obligations. 
"[I]t has become estab-
lished law for equity courts to hold the statute inapplicable 
- 8 -
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when a contracting party has parti~lly performed his sh1re of 
the bargain." Williston on Contracts, § 533, p. 776, (3d Ed. 
1960) . 
Ute-Cal's performance is not merely its improvements 
to the property of the assumption of the equipment lease on the 
representation that it would acquire the real property lease, 
but its tender of rental, which although admittedly late on 
occasion was nonetheless accepted by respondents. This action 
of accepting rent as well as various other actions and repre-
sentations estop lessors from asserting the Statute. 
The necessary elements of estoppel have been defined 
as conduct by the party to be estopped that intentionally or 
through culpable negligence influences another justifiable 
action taken by the induced party, and inj~ry caused by the 
reliance. Joy EnterPrises, Inc. v. Reooel, 537 P.2d 591 (Ari~. 
1975). The Reppel court held that when all three of the above 
elements were present, a lease that falls short of being a 
valid contract would estop l~sso~s from denying enforceability. 
Lessor had in that case accepted rent, allowed improvements and 
allowed lessee to pay some of lessor's debts. Estoppel from 
denying an oral lease was also held as the proper remedy in 
Collier v. Foster, 365 So. 2d 1136 (La. 1978), where the plain-
tiff after being assured he could farm the land ~hraugh 1979 
assumed notes on a tractor. 
- 9 -
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The Utah Supreme Court has h~nted at an acceptance 
of the estoppel theory in Evershed v. Berry, 436 P.2d 438 (Utah 
1968) . The Court held that receipt of rent by lessor would suf-
fice to create either a tenancy at will, or at most, one from 
year-to-year. In a footnote the Court stated that standing 
by silently while another expended sums for improvements was 
"a possible basis for involving an estoppel." 
In the present action, Cutler, as President of Inter-
mountain, represented to Buffo that it was "okay'1 to expend 
monies on the property (Tr. 118). He also made representations 
to Glen Groo, leasing manager of MFT, that a lease agreement 
sufficiently long to protect MFT's interest in equipment had 
been arranged with Buffo (Tr. 83, BD 52). Grob was satisfied 
enough with the purported Ute-Cal/Intermountain agreement that 
he encouraged Buffo to assume Investestate's liabilities. The 
effect of respondent's actions should clearly be to estop them 
from denying the existence of a valid lease. 
The question of how to provide content to the presumed 
valid lease is answered by either allowing a continuance of 
tenancy on same terms and stibject to same covenants as in original 
lease. (In this instance, Investestate's). See Arol Development 
v. Goodie Brand Packing, 372 N.Y.S.2d 324 (1973), affd. 378 
N.Y.S.2d 231. Otherwise, a principle stated by this court is to 
look to the terms of the lease, even if invalid, and weigh with 
other factors to adjust the rights of the parties. 
- 1 () -
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The result of the l3tter course is to validate the 
terms of Exhibit 17, the unsig~ed lease agreement 3ent by 
Ute-Cal's counsel (Tr. 72), which was indicated as acceptable 
to Buffo (BO 25; 64) by Intermountain causing him to forego 
a possible extension of the Adams lease and expend heavily on 
improvements. 
This testimony ·at page 64 of Buffo's deposition 
raises the final theory validating the negotiated lease agree-
ment. Respondents waived their right to execution of their 
lease. In McKennon v. Anderson, 298 P.2d 492 (Wash. 1956} 
the court held that plaintiff/tenant was entitled to possession 
of premises despite the Statute of Frauds. The court held that 
the failure of appellants to present plaintiff with a formal 
lease after repeatedly asserting such would be done, waived 
the necessity for such a document through inducing the respondent 
to change his position on the face of the agreement. 
POINT II 
THERE WAS NO VALID SERVICE UNDER THE UTAH 
UNLAWFUL DETAINER STATUTE. 
As the trial court noted at 152, the occupying tenant 
must be served in order for compliance with the Unlawful Detainer 
Statutes, §§ 78-36-3; 38-36-6, Utah Code Ann., (1953). Not 
only must the proper party be served, but the form of the notice 
is mandated. Thus the 15-day notice to quit held sufficient 
- 11 -
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in§ 78-36-3(2), Utah Code Ann., to terminate a month-to-month 
tenancy has no effect if served upon one requiring notice under 
subdivision 78-36-3(5), Utah Code Ann., such notice having to 
be in the alternative form of performing the covenants or sur-
rendering the premises. Ute-Cal asserts that notice was deficien 
for both of the above reasons. 
This Court has held that an unlawful detainer action 
is the sole remedy at law £or recovery of premises by a tenant 
for less than life and that a landlord has no cause bf action 
for restitution without having complied with the Unlawful DetaineI 
Statute by giving notice complying with the terms of the statute, 
American Holding Company v. Hanson, 464 P.2d 592 (Utah 1970). 
Since Ute-Cal is asserting a lease with a definite period, it 
does not fall under§ 78-36-3(2). If respondents are attempt-
ing an action under either§ 78-36-3(3) or (5), the statute 
quite clearly calls for alternative notice. Exhibit 20 is a 
Notice to Quit and does not list an option to perform to regain 
status quo arite. The notice is deficient and there is no cause 
of action in unlawful detainer. 
Further, the Court has held that no one other than a 
tenant of real property for a term less than life can be guilty 
of unlawful detainer. Holladay Coal Co. v. Kirker, 57 P. 882 
(Utah 1899). Disregarding the form of the notice, valid service 
- 12 -
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must be made upon the tenant. The strict compliance with the 
service of notice is enforced 3S rigidly 3S ~orm requirements, 
with an eye toward legislative intent, the harshness of the 
remedy and the summary nature of the proceeding. ?~:-;,:i~b v. 
Spencer, 243 P.2d 446 (Utah 1952); Carstensen v. Hansen, 152 
P . 2 d 9 5 4 ( Utah 1 9 4 4 ) . 
Appellants allege that there was no valid notice of 
service as to either form or delivery upon the tenant of the 
Exchange Club, Ute-Cal. Likewise, mailed service to Buffo as 
an individual was void as to Ute-Cal for lack of good personal 
service. Respondent should not be heard to claim surprise or 
prejudice at these facts, since the record indicates Ms. Halliday 
informed the servers she could not accept service (Tr. 155). 
In a like vein, earlier service to Jim Racine, a nonmember of 
Ute-Cal, was ineffective to create a month-to-month tenancy for 
Ute-Cal. 
In interpreting the strictness to which the notice 
requirement is held, the Supreme Court held an attempt to com-
ply with an alternative means of service was to no effect even 
though a copy of service was left at plaintiff's place of busi-
ness with a suitable person because the statute also required 
a copy sent through the mail addressed to the tenant. Perkins, 
supra, at 449. (ruling on former§ 104-60-6(2), Utah Code Ann., 
(1943)). Thus the Court established that actual knowledge of 
- 13 -
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the recipient with regards to the notice was irrelevant. 
This stance was stated flatly in Carstensen, supra, at 955: 
Under statutes like this, it is not 
the fact that the party to be notified 
has actual knowledge of the fact, but 
it is proof that it has been conveyed 
to him in the prescribed method, that 
gives the right of action. (citing cases) 
Appellants in the present action have not received 
a valid notice under any theory of service. No alternative 
form was used, no agent of the corporation received a copy 
served personally, and the mail ?ervice on Buffo was not in 
his capacity as a corporate officer (Tr. 135; 152), nor was 
the mailing simultaneous with effective personal service as 
required in §§ 78-36-6(2) and (3). 
§ 78-36-6 allows three possible types of service of 
notice to quit. Subsebtion (1) has not been met. Appellants 
claim that neither subsection (2) nor (3) have been fulfilled. 
Subsection (2) requires leaving a copy of service with "some 
person of suitable age and discretion." Although this might 
seemingly validate the notices served upon Exchange Club per-
sonnel, a cross-reference to Rule 4(e) (4), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, proves this is not so. The above rule sets the 
standard for personal service of a corporation in Utah. The 
section authorizing service by delivery to any person doing 
business or in charge of a place of business has been defined 
- 14 -
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by the Court to require more than a mere employee. The person 
must have significant responsibility with the corporation. 
Beard v. White, Green & Addison . \s socia tes, Inc. , 8 u. 2d 4 2 3, 
336 P.2d 125. Appellants have already shown that the persons 
served had no relationship to Ute-Cal corporation. Thus there 
is no ser-vice under subsection (2). Subsection (3) allows the 
same service to a person that must be referenced to Rule 4, Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. In addition, it allows service by 
affixing a copy in a conspicuous place on the leased property. 
Respondents did not meet this requirement or any of the options 
allowed above. There was no valid service on Ute-Cal, either 
to alter its tenancy or place it into unlawful detainer. The 
action should be dismissed for lack of service, Carstensen, 
supra. 
POINT III 
THE LOWER COURT MADE AN IMPROPER DETERMINA-
TION OF DAMAGES. 
Of course, should this Court find no action in unlawful 
detainer, the question of damages is moot. However, it appellants, 
either separately or jointly, are held liable for damages, this 
Court should declare an improper determination of damages. 
A. TREBLE DAMAGES ARE NOT MANDATORY UNDER 
THE UNLAWFUL DETAINER ACT AND ARE UN-
JUST AND UNNECESSARY I~J THE HTSTA..1\TT C"\SE. 
At least one sister jurisdiction with an unlawful 
detainer statute substantially the same as Utah's has held 
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that"absent a showing of malice, wantonness or oppression, 
treble damages cannot properly be awarded in an action for 
unlawful detainer." Mecham v. ~re:lson, 451 P.2d 529 (Id. 1969). 
The relevant Idaho statute, I. C., § 6-316, provides: 
Judgment - Treble damages - Restitution. -
If, upon the trial, the verdict of the jury, 
or, if the case be tried without a jury, the 
finding of the court, be in favor of the 
plaintiff and against the defendant, judg-
ment shall be entered for the restitution 
of the premises; and if the proceeding be 
for an unlawful detainer after neglect or 
failure to perform the conditions or coven-
ants of the lease or agreement under which 
the property is held, or after default in 
the payment of rent, the judgment shall also 
declare the forfeiture of such lease or 
agreement. The jury, or the court, if 
the proceeding be tried without a jury, 
shall also assess the damages occasioned 
to the plaintiff by any forcible entry, 
or by any forcible or unlawful detainer, 
alleged in the complaint and proved on 
the trial, and fined the amount of any 
rent due, if the alleged unlawful detainer 
be after default in the payment of rent, 
and the judgment shall be rendered against 
the defendant guilty of the forcible 
entry, or forcible or unlawful detainer, 
for three times the amount of the damages 
thus assessed, and of the rent found due. 
The Utah Supreme Court, whether influenced by this 
precedent or not, has recently issued an unlawful detainer 
decision in which it did not award treble damages, Price 
Construction Co., Inc. v. Foutz, Nd. 16688 (Utah May 30, 1980). 
In that case in which defendant/buyer/appellants were found 
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guilty in detainer, this Court ordered plaintiff/seller to 
return a down payment to buyers, but adjusted t~e amount 
returned by crediting defendants for improvements and allow-
ing plaintiffs the amount of monthly rent agreed upon. This 
rental amount was not trebled by detainer. 
The equities in the present case argue convincingly 
against declaring a treble recovery. ~ppellants were the 
original aggrieved parties who came to court seeking enforce-
ment of their rights. They made a good faith tender of money 
into the court while pursuing that remedy. Although this Court 
may feel that some damages are just, certainly a treble award 
violates the concept of fundamental fairness. This Court 
should declare the trebling of unlawful detainer damages dis-
cretionary and decline to do so in this case. 
Appellants should also be credited for the improve-
ments they made to respondents' property, (admitted to in 
trial brief at 21). The credit for improvements should be 
deducted before trebling, if any, since it goes directly to 
the reduction of damage loss. 
B. RESPONDENTS SHOULD HAVE NO RECOVERY 
FOR THE PERIOD AFTER :11\RCH 3, 1980. 
Appellants were charged by the court for $936~00 
rent, trebled, for the month of _:;pril 1980. This aMount. should 
be excluded. Appellants were prohibited from vacat.ing the 
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premises by a Writ of Attachment entered.by the Clerk of the 
Court on March 28, 1980 and served March 31, 1980 at respon-
dents' request. 
Appellant Buffo was physically restrained from re-
moving his personal property from the premises by the police. 
Whereas, respondents admit that appellants removed their pro-
perty from the leased premises as soon as respondents' restraint 
allowed, they should not be held liable for their failure to 
vacate. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellants have quit the contested premises and do 
not seek repossession; however, this Court should declare that 
Ute-Cal had a legal or alternately an equitable right to the 
quiet enjoyment of those premises during the period disputed. 
This right was not terminated by any service of notice valid 
under the·utah Unlawful Detainer Statute. This lack of a sub-
stantive right on the procedural deficiencies involved pre-
clude an award of damages to respondent. 
Should the Court uphold the lower court's finding 
of law and fact, the amount of damages should be reduced. 
The C~urt should declare discretionary treble damages unfair 
under the circumstances and make a proper off set for improve-
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ments to respondent's real property. 
1980. 
Appellants respectfully request t~e above relief. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 5th day of September, 
;~ I.~ !( UJlbp Q -
Rebert M. McRae 
McRAE & DeLAND 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
and Third Party Defendant/Appellant 
72 East Fourth South, ~355 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
MAILED OR HAD DELIVERED two copies of the foregoing 
Appellant's Brief this 5th day of September, 1980, postage 
prepaid, to Gordon Strachan of Prince, Yeates & Geldzahler, 
Attorneys for Defendants/Respondents, 424 East Fifth South, 
#300, Salt Lake City, UT 84111. 
7Zdclttv~ 
Robert M. McRae 
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